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TRANSCRIPT OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND A
FREE PRESS: SEMINAL ISSUES AS VIEWED
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE PROGRESSIVE CASE'
WELCOME
David Rudenstine^
It is wonderful having you all here for this very special twenty-fifth
anniversary commemoration of this historic case involving the
publication of the article by The Progressive magazine.
The idea for this conference was hatched about a year and a half
ago by Frank Tuerkheimer, who is a visiting professor at Cardozo and
the Hahush-Bascom professor of law at the University of Wisconsin
School of Law. When Frank was visiting Cardozo last year, we were
chatting about the case and he brought to my attention that he had been
the U.S. Attorney who initially filed the complaint against The
Progressive magazine. He told me that there were some things that he
had never said about this case that he might want to say. He reminded
me that this was going to be the twenty-fifth anniversary of the case.
One thing led to another and here we are in the room today with many
of the principals who were involved in the litigation. I want to thank
Frank for having the dominating hand in bringing about this conference
today.
I also want to thank the Cardozo Law Review. The law review
staff has been doing much of the legwork that made it possible for the
conference to take place. Ian Dumain, a third year student and the
Executive Editor of the Law Review, assisted me in pulling together
some documents for my own edification on the case. I also asked Ian if
he would draft a memorandum detailing the background of the case.
That superior memorandum, which is very carefully footnoted, sets out
' This is an edited and lightly footnoted version of the transcript of a symposium held at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law on March 2, 2004. Some participants have more folly
incorporated their comments in Articles included in this issue. See Howard Morland, Born
Secret, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401 (2005); Ray E. Kidder, Weapons of Mass Destruction and a
Free Press, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1389 (2005).
2 Dean, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
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the facts and circumstances surrounding the litigation, is part of the
materials distributed to you.^
I also wish to thank the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional
Democracy and its two co-directors, Professors Michel Rosenfeld and
Professor Richard Weisberg, for sponsoring today's events. Of course,
I also want to thank the guests who will be speaking today for making
this conference important.
I want to spend a few minutes reviewing the facts and
circumstances surrounding this litigation, and then perhaps at the end
make two general points that relate the litigation to broader events as
well. Howard Morland, who will be speaking later this morning, wrote
the article that triggered this famous litigation: "The H-Bomb Secret:
How We Got It—Why We're Telling It." It was scheduled to be
published by The Progressive. The article—^pre-publication—^was
submitted for review to the United States Government. Once The
Progressive made it clear that it would not alter the substance of the
article and that it would not cease and desist from publishing it, the
decision was made by the government to initiate an action to enjoin The
Progressive from publishing.
Judge Robert W. Warren granted a temporary restraining order
barring The Progressive from publishing the article on March 9, 1979
and he granted a preliminary injunction on March 26. That was the
very first preliminary injunction granting a prior restraint in the history
of the United States. The last episode that involved such an effort was
the Pentagon Papers case where the judge granted a temporary
restraining order for a period of days; however, a judge never entered a
preliminary injunction. About six months later, the goverrunent
abandoned the case against The Progressive because another
publication had already revealed the secret information. In the
November 1979 issue of The Progressive, Howard Morland's article
was published under a new name: "The H-Bomb Secret: To Know How
is to Ask Why."
The case itself will be discussed in some detail this morning, but
let me make five general points about the case. First, this is the First
Amendment background: the H-Bomb case pitted the free press against
national security matters. Although free press rights are obviously
highly valued and generally bar prior restraints, there is an exception to
that general prohibition. That exception arises when national seciuity
matters are put clearly into focus and the court is persuaded that
national security warrants prior restraint. The only other case prior to

3 See Ian Dumain, No Secret, No Defense: United States v. Progressive, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1323 (2005).
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the H-Bomb case where this issue was raised was the Pentagon Papers
case involving the New York Times' and the Washington Post's, as well
as other newspapers', efforts to publish the secret history of the
Vietnam War. That history was leaked by Daniel Ellsberg. It had been
classified top secret and after a couple of days of publications, the
United States of America sued the New York Times and obtained a
temporary restraining order (TRO). When it was leaked further to the
Washington Post, the government obtained a TRO against the Post and
then within about fifteen days, the case was before the U.S. Supreme
Court, which eventually dissolved the temporary restraining order and
allowed the newspapers to go forward and to publish. But apart from
the Pentagon Papers case, the H-Bomb case was the first of its kind in
the country.
The general rule with regard to prior restraint is that if the
information that the government is trying to suppress is in the public
domain, a prior restraint shall not be granted. If the information is
classified and is not in the public domain, the government at least has a
fighting chance to satisfy the requirements of law that would warrant a
prior restraint.
Although others disagreed. Judge Warren found that most—and
some would say all—of the factual information involved in this article
was already in the public domain. But Judge Warren decided that the
concepts embedded in the article were not in the public domain and
these concepts related to the operation of the hydrogen bomb. Or, to
rephrase. Judge Warren suggested that although the specific technical
information contained in the article might be in the public domain, "due
recognition" must be given to the human skills and expertise involved in
writing this article.
Judge Warren also concluded that the threat presented by the
publication was that it could provide information sufficient to allow a
medium-sized nation to move faster in developing a hydrogen weapon.
It could provide what he called "a ticket to bypass blind alleys." So, in
time, that is the kind of claim that the government made and that the
judge found persuasive for that particular case.
To put the matter in slightly different words. Judge Warren found
that there were five members of what one might call the nuclear club:
the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China.
He worried that the membership in the nuclear club might be expanded
to six or seven members if this article was published, and that the
expansion might happen much sooner than it would have otherwise if
the article was not published.
The legal standard that he applied in the case in deciding whether
or not to grant a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction was that the publication would result in "direct, immediate
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and irreparable injury to [the United States].'"' It was not at all clear
from prior cases that this was, in fact, the required legal standard, but
Judge Warren said that was the standard he was using, and when he
weighed the evidence, he thought that it met that standard.
The last fact about his opinion that I would bring to your attention
was how he parsed the various factors before him at the time. He said
that if he granted the prior restraint against The Progressive and, in
doing so, made an error, the net result would be injury to what he called
"our cherished First Amendment rights." On the other hand, he said
that if he made an error and denied a prior restraint to the government in
circumstances in which the government should otherwise have a prior
restraint he could "pave the way for thermonuclear annihilation for all
of us."
Under these circumstances, as Judge Warren defined them, he
concluded, "[t]he risk is simply too great to permit publication"^ even
though the First Amendment limited prior restraints to the most narrow
set of circumstances.
In addition to making these five points to help refresh your
recollection of the case, let me make two others. One has to do with the
difficulties of predicting harm that the government or judges or all
others face in a whole variety of circumstances. The government in the
H-Bomb case, as well as Judge Warren himself, faced the difficult task
of making a very quick judgment about the risks of publication.
Although the government's position was complex, at its core was the
fear of nuclear proliferation. If this article is published, the claim went,
other nations may secure the weapon and they may do so much sooner
than they might otherwise. As reasonable as this claim appeared, time
disproved its factual premise.
Thus, on January 4, 2004, Gregg Easterbrook published an article
in the New York Times entitled "The Atomic Club: If the Bomb Is so
Easy to Make, Why Don't More Nations Have It?" In the article, Mr.
Easterbrook wrote the following: "In 1979, a national controversy
erupted when The Progressive Magazine printed an article describing
the hydrogen bomb's basic engineering principles. Commentators
proclaimed that many nations and even individual terror cells would
respond by building hydrogen bombs. Yet since 1979, no nation has
joined the hydrogen bomb club."®
Predicting harm presents, to say the least, a complex problem. In
the Pentagon Papers case, the government stated that further
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 1000 (W.D. Wise 1979) (citing New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Justice Stewart concurring)).
5 Id. at 996.
^ Gregg Easterbrook, The Atomic Club: If the Bomb Is so Easy to Make, Why Don't More
Nations Have it?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004, Week in Review at 1.
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publication of the secret history involving America's involvement in the
Vietnam War would undermine war plans, sabotage intelligence
operations, and compromise the ability of the United States to negotiate
a peace. More recently, as we all are aware. United States forces in the
Iraq war, which was premised on Iraq's possession of weapons of mass
destruction, have failed to discover such weapons and the actual
existence of such weapons. We cannot escape as a citizenry the
problems of prediction, but the risks and hazards of predictions are
obvious, and they were made clear in The Progressive case.
The second general point has to do with the deference that we
should pay to senior govemment officials and to scientific experts on
these complex matters that affect national security. The H-Bomb case
puts into focus the degree to which judges as well as citizens should
defer to senior govemment officials and experts in matters like this.
Thus, Judge Warren was clearly in a very difficult position. He was
faced with a very complicated scientific matter and had before him
conflicting affidavits and statements offered by people steeped in the
field. He was asked, in effect, to make a decision about these
conflicting factual claims and to do so very quickly. In addition, he was
told by senior govemment officials that further publication would
irreparably injure the United States and that he should accept their
judgment because they were far more qualified than he to make this
judgment.
The same dynamic was present in the Pentagon Papers case and in
other circumstances involving national security. A reading of Judge
Warren's opinion persuades me, at least, that Judge Warren deferred
substantially to the govemment and that he did so because he concluded
that by not deferring he ran the risk of nuclear proliferation because it
accelerated what he called "the capacity of certain non-thermonuclear
nations to manufacture nuclear weapons.Would Judge Warren have
deferred as much as he did if he did not perceive the risks to be so
monumental? There is obviously no certain answer to that question, but
it is unlikely.
The point is plain. As we perceive the risks of national security
rising and the threat becoming more serious to our welfare, our
livelihood, and our way of life, the inclination to compromise other
important values becomes stronger, at least on behalf of many people,
as I think it did in Judge Warren's case back in 1979. Judge Warren
made the point in the most dramatic terms he could when he explained
his reasoning; this is what he wrote in 1979: "A mistaken mling against
the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear annihilation for

^ Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 999.

1342

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:4

all of us. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and our right to
publish becomes moot."
Should we guard against such inclinations and weighing of the
issues? And if we should, how do we do that? I am not going to
answer that question today. It is an imponderable question and it
bedevils this particular case as it did the Pentagon Papers case and to
some extent as it did the debate surrounding the Iraq war a year ago.
Today's conference will certainly explore these and other
important questions. To help us to get underway, Frank Tuerkheimer
will introduce former Secretary of Defense and Energy, James
Schlesinger. So please join me in welcoming Professor Tuerkheimer.
CONTEXT
James R. Schlesinger^
PROFESSOR TUERKHEIMER: Our first speaker is James
Schlesinger. James Schlesinger received his undergraduate. Masters
and Doctoral degrees from Harvard University. He then taught
economics for several years at the University of Virginia. His first
major entry into high public service positions came in 1969 when he
became an assistant director in the Bureau of the Budget. He was
subsequently appointed to the Atomic Energy Commission, which he
then chaired, and after that became the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
In 1973, he was appointed Secretary of Defense, about midway
into the Cold War. Our strategy in the Cold War originated at the
initiation of the Cold War when the United States had nuclear
superiority in the world. Mr. Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense
challenged that assumption and worked on the theory that the Soviet
Union and the United States were roughly in parity when it came to
nuclear weaponry. In his view, this required that we increase our nonnuclear arsenal considerably, so that we would not over-rely on nuclear
weapons in the event of a dispute with the Soviet Union, obviously with
a view towards avoiding the kind of catastrophe that would come from
nuclear weapons. He then championed the notion that we had to arrive
at a considerably stronger conventional force in our military arsenal.
He became the first Secretary of Energy in 1977 and remained in
that position through The Progressive case and had a major hand in its
initiation. He is presently the chairman of the Mitre Corporation, a
8 Chairman, Mitre Corporation and Senior advisor to Lehman Brothers; Former Secretary of
Energy and Secretary of Defense.
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Washington, D.C. think tank that, among other things, consults and
advises the Department of Defense. He is also a senior advisor to
Lehman Brothers.
I want to note that in modem times, as I see it, he is the only
person to have been appointed to Cabinet-level rank by both Republican
and Democratic Presidents—Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter. I think
that speaks more for his talents than any words that I can add at this
point and so I will not try to do so and simply indicate that it is a great
honor on behalf of the Cardozo Law School to present to you James
Schlesinger.
MR. SCHLESINGER: Thank you. Professor Tuerkheimer—and
thank you for your role in bringing this case to Judge Warren's
attention. Some of you may not know, but the first judge that was
approached was in the Western District of Wisconsin. He recused
himself because he was a friend of the people who worked at The
Progressive magazine. Thus, Frank TuerlAeimer brought us to Judge
Warren who, in subsequent commentary, has been denounced because
he was a conservative and a Nixon appointee, a subject to which I will
retum later. And thank you. Dean Rudenstine, for your eloquent
discussion. You have taken most of what I had to say away from me.
We are, needless to say, gathered here today on the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the case United States v. Progressive, Inc. Twenty-five
years ago yesterday, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense,
Lynn Coleman called to inform Messrs. Knoll and Day that, after
review, the Morland article contained Restricted Data as defined by the
Atomic Energy Act—and, therefore, should be revised before
publication. Twenty-five years ago next week. Judge Warren issued his
temporary restraining order. Several weeks later, after an offer of
mediation. Judge Warren issued a preliminary injunction against
publication.
While I am not a legal scholar, and you have just heard the
testimony of a legal scholar, this case has been discovered as the first
(and thus the only) order of prior restraint in U.S. history. As such, it
has certainly captured the attention of the press and, if I may say so, has
won me relatively few friends in the press.
It should, of course, capture the attention of all who are interested
in public policy. What we are dealing with here are the central issues
for a free society: the balance between freedom and order and, at core,
whether or not a free society can protect itself.
I submit that these core issues transcend the precise details of the
case. I suspect that you will hear later some support for an absolutist
interpretation of the First Amendment. But I remind you that even
before we had the First Amendment, the Constitution stipulated our
national goal—to provide for the common defense.
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1 should also underscore that the Supreme Court has never
subscribed to the absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment that
some in the press have urged. One might mention Justice Holmes'
dictum, there is no freedom to shout "Fire!" in a crowded theater,^ or
the decision of the Court in Near v. Minnesota, which Judge Warren
applied in The Progressive case, or most relevantly, as Dean Rudenstine
has indicated, the (at that time recent) experience with the Pentagon
Papers case, in which the Court found against the government six to
three. But the Court did underscore that there was no absolutist
interpretation of the First Amendment. As Justice Jackson long ago so
eloquently, succinctly, and pungently put it, the Constitution is not a
suicide pact.'®
Let me turn now to the broader issues Dean Rudenstine has
discussed: the question of nuclear spread, and the broader issues of
foreign and security policy. The atomic bombs over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki brought political shock as well as the relief in the ending of
the war without a costly invasion of the Japanese home islands.
Congress immediately went to work and passed the Atomic Energy Act
in 1947. That act specified that all Restricted Data, whatever its origins,
was "bom classified," and that the Atomic Energy Commission was to
enforce that requirement. I do not believe that the Congress at the time
expected that this action would preclude all future dissemination of
information about nuclear explosives. The authors expected change
over time. But the Congress wished to delay that dissemination for as
long a period as possible.
In the 1950s, there was universal eoncem about the possibility of
the spread of nuclear weapons and great apprehension best summarized
by Leo Szilard, one of the original workers on the Manhattan Project,
who plaintively asked, "What happens when Swaziland gets the bomb?"
And Judge Warren, as has been mentioned, said, "I don't want to give
the hydrogen bomb to Idi Amin.""
At the time. President Kennedy sought to prevent or slow down the
spread of nuclear weapons. He stated famously, "1 am haunted by the
thought that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear
powers. And by 1975, fifteen or twenty nuclear powers. Yet, then the
potential spread was constrained by the disciplines of the Cold War,
9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.").
10 Terminiello V. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) ("There is danp that, if the Court
does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
11 Bill Peterson & Charles R. Babcock, Magazine Barred From Publishing H-Bomb Article;
Judge Blocks Article On Hydrogen Bomb, WASH. POST, March 10, 1979, at A1 ("1 want to think
a long, hard time before I'd give a hydrogen bomb to Idi Amin. It appears to me that is just what
we're doing here.").
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which had its advantages in that both the United States and the Soviet
Union helped to preclude their associates and their clients from reaching
for nuclear weapons. With those disciplines we have been far more
successful (until now) than the pessimists expected in forestalling the
spread of nuclear weapons. Those earlier barriers have lasted for almost
forty years. Until the late 1990s, only the five permanent members of
the Security Coimcil were regarded as nuclear weapons states.
In the late 1970s, President Carter made preventing proliferation a
central goal of his foreign policy, if not the central goal. Perhaps that
helps explain why the President authorized Attorney General Bell to
proceed with The Progressive case. I might add in passing that
President Kennedy and Carter are not normally regarded as insensitive
to liberal views, nor was Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State who wrote
an affidavit to the court.
More recently, the success that we previously enjoyed in slowing
proliferation has been breaking down. This has especially been
highlighted by the revelation of A.Q. Kahn's commercial enterprise in
Pakistan delivering centrifuge technology and equipment, and possibly
bomb designs, to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. That development
topped Saddam Hussein's previous success, up until the Gulf War, in
moving towards the production of fissile material. All of these
techniques originate in the European enterprise known as URENCO,
whose centrifuge technology regrettably has spread far and wide.
It has become a central preoccupation of the Bush Administration
to prevent or to circumscribe the spread of weapons to rogue nations
and particularly to terrorists. The concern is that terrorists are more
difficult—if not impossible—^to deter in the way we deter nation-states.
Terrorists have expressed their desire to kill Americans and,
consequently, if they acquired a nuclear weapon they likely would use it
here, assuming they could deliver it. These matters highlight and justify
the apprehensions of the Congress in 1947 to do whatever possible to
prevent the dissemination of critical nuclear technology.
The
dissemination of such information unquestionably threatens critical
damage to the United States.
Of course, the 1979 case could not have prevented in any way what
is now occurring several decades later, nor could these precise
developments have been foreseen. But such developments, which have
reinforced our concern over proliferation, do explain the motivation the
Congress had in its earlier action.
As Secretary of Energy in 1979, and as the inheritor of the
responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission (which I had
previously chaired), I could only enforce or ignore the clear intent of the
law. So the Department of Energy and the Justice Department
proceeded to offer The Progressive help in revising the Morland article
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in order to remove Restrieted Data or, alternatively, to enjoin its
publication if it would not agree to that revision. I should emphasize
that without the Restricted Data the same political points about the
dangers of nuclear secrecy could have been made. But The Progressive
was unwilling to cooperate then or later when Judge Warren urged
mediation just before issuing his injunction.
The reaction in the press was consternation and ambivalence, not
necessarily opposition. For example, the Washington Post, a victor in
the previous Pentagon Papers case, in an editorial entitled "John
Mitchell's Dream Case" wrote, "As a press-versus-govemment First
Amendment contest, as far as we can tell, is John Mitchell's dream
case—the one the Nixon Administration was never lucky enough to get:
a real First Amendment loser.''^^ "There is a specific law, the Atomic
Energy Act, covering this type of information; the information itself
evidently cannot be characterized as that earlier material could as being
not just of a largely historical nature
"—^reference to the Pentagon
Papers case— "[T]he magazine, on its own motion, should decide now
against printing the piece, or at least its troubling sections. It will be
doing everyone—including the friends of the First Amendment—a great
service if it does so."'^
The Post later would modify its position, suggesting that the
judge's order was unconstitutional, and the Post began to veer toward
an absolutist position on the First Amendment. But it added even in
that later editorial that it feared that the Supreme Court, given what it
described as its current membership, would not follow the Post's
preferred interpretation of the Constitution. The Post then again urged
The Progressive to compromise. It feared that the Court would rule
against unfettered press freedom.
It is noteworthy that many liberal scientists, who strongly oppose
the government's policy on nuclear weapons, were alarmed by the
proliferation implications and urged The Progressive to back down.
This included Hans Bethe, whom Judge Warren cited in his order. In
that order, the judge had mentioned that the defendants acknowledged
that the freedom of the press was not absolute but he may not have
captured the imderlying attitude. In the biography of Irwin Knoll was
the suggestive title, "An Enemy of the State," clearly indicating that
Knoll gravitated toward the wisdom "of taking an absolutist position on
the First Amendment." Then he declared that the ultimate goal was to
destroy the secrecy arrangements of the U.S. government and that the
govemment was concocting fables about its interest in nonproliferation—this during the regime of Jimmy Carter, who was paying

12 Editorial, John Mitchell's Dream Case, WASH. POST, March 11, 1979, at C6.
13 Id.
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a high international price offending the Europeans by insisting that the
reprocessing of plutonium cease worldwide. Carter's reputation among
European governments at that time was, if anything, lower than is that
of George W. Bush.
Whatever one's attitude toward the constitutional issues, I submit
that Knoll's goals were scarcely responsible positions. The Constitution
allows the press to be irresponsible—^but not to the extent that it may
pose a threat to thousands of lives. Here we are in the present context
some twenty-five years later, and these issues go to the current debate:
whether one should or should not preempt terrorists or wait for a crime
to be committed and then prosecute.
In the current context, one can find on the Internet the formula for
several nerve gasses, to say nothing of bomb designs. Given the
possibilities of biological warfare, would one really object (if it could be
done) to the government preventing the dissemination of instructions on
how to engineer pathogens like smallpox, anthrax, or hemorrhagic fever
so that they were impervious to the available antidotes or therapies?
Regrettably, I would say that the passage of time, which has
strengthened the motivation to limit such dissemination, has also
drastically reduced our ability to do so. Given the Internet and the
extent of international communications today, any national action by the
United States alone would be ineffective. Even twenty-five years ago,
the potential of an injunction was breaking down. Accomplices in other
countries could arrange publication even in the light of a prior restraint
in this country. Indeed, some newspaper up in Winnipeg published the
Morland article with its diagrams and there were attempts to publish it
in Australia. So even twenty-five years ago, the information was not
something that we could constrain. Still Congress in 1947 could not
foresee that.
In conclusion, 1 suggest that though Judge Warren was right in his
logic, in the law and in his order, time has passed this issue by, and that
the possibilities of suppressing information through prior restraint, for
better or worse, have largely evaporated.
I said at the outset that the larger issues transcended the particulars
of the case and I urge you to bear in mind on this larger issue the wise
council of Justice Frankfixrter, "Free speech is not so absolute or
irrational a conception as to imply paralysis of the means for effective
protection of all the freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights.''^^
Thank you very much.
QUESTION: At the time The Progressive case was initiated were
there any discussion about the political ramifications as opposed to
simply the technical issues related to obtaining an injunction?

14 Bridges V. California, 314 U.S. 252, 279 (1941) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
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MR. SCHLESINGER: The two critical Cabinet members were
Griffin Bell and myself, and neither of us was inclined towards those
kinds of political calculations. Griffin Bell followed his view of the
law, and my view was quite simple—^that this was an obligation that had
been imposed upon the Secretary of Energy under the Atomic Energy
Act and that I really had no alternative but to proceed. Neither of us
thought about the political implications, or at least I did not.
Actually, we were surprised at the opposition. While one might
expect some squawking from the press, the notion that somebody might
be providing help to some future proliferator in reducing the time it took
to develop a hydrogen bomb did not strike us as a popular notion from
which one could extract political advantage.
If it were not for Judge Bell as Attorney General, this case would
not have gone forward. When my General Counsel and I met with
Judge Bell, they were there—^the Deputy Attorney General, Mr.
Civiletti and a number of Department lawyers. As we waited in the
outer office of the Attorney General, I noticed on the desk of his
secretary a sign that says, "First let's kill all the lawyers," said
Shakespeare in Henry VI. So I picked it up and stepped into the
Attorney General's office and put it down on his desk, as we discussed
the case. Aside from Judge Bell, I did not detect anybody in the
Department of Justice who was eager to pursue the case. My own
General Counsel, Lynn Coleman, was himself initially doubtful,
arguing, one, the government had never won a prior restraint argument,
and two, that this would simply publicize the article and that the process
of discussion might reveal more information than simply allowing it
quietly to be published. I have no doubt that we did give a commercial
boost to The Progressive.
When he read the Atomic Energy Act carefully, he saw that we
really had no alternative. But initially, he was hesitant. The people in
the nuclear weapons division, the Assistant Secretary and the Director
of Research were both strongly in favor of going ahead. Going ahead
means that they favored trying to persuade Progressive Magazine not to
publish Restricted Data. Whether at that time they would have gone so
far as to say, "Can we get a judge to issue an injunction against
publication?" I do not know. As a general proposition most decisions
that I have seen in the government, despite all that one hears about only
looking at the hard evidence, and the facts and only the facts, etc.,
almost all of them have an eye out for domestic politics. This one was
an exception simply because there are very few people in the United
States who favor spreading information about how to build nuclear
weapons abroad.
[In response to another question, Mr. Schlesinger stated:] Given
the nature of the law, the Atomic Energy Act said that the Secretary of
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Energy, as the suceessor to the Atomic Energy Commission, had the
obligation to prevent dissemination of Restricted Data. I had the
privilege, as it were, of choosing between ignoring the law or
attempting to enforce it. My own attitude towards these issues when I
was Secretary of Energy was, quite broadly, that we may have a lot of
stupid laws on the books but the way to demonstrate that they are stupid
is try to enforce them. That particularly applied to some of the
decisions that the Congress had written with regard to the allocation of
fuel, gasoline in particular, during a cut-off of the sort that we had when
the Shah was expelled from Iran in 1979. So, we had an allocation
system that simply was irrational but it had been legislated. A way to
demonstrate that it did not work was to enforce the law. Somebody
more devious than I might have said that, "Well, that won't work."
[In response to another question, Mr. Schlesinger stated:] In the
last decade, and particularly since such countries as North Korea, Libya,
and Iran have moved into the field of enrichment, and given an attitude
of less responsibility even than India and Pakistan (whom we had
previously tried to head off from acquiring nuclear weapons)—^we have
reached a tipping point in a sense. If we are not to have universal but
widespread availability of nuclear weapons with all the daily fear that
that will generate, that a more vigorous policy is called for. One may or
may not agree with the President regarding the "Axis of Evil," but it is
plain that in order to head off the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
other states that a more direct multilateral pressure will have to be
exercised.
As to the broader point that you raise, I think that that was covered
by Dean Rudenstine. As the level of anxiety or fear rises, the
governments will move in the direction of lesser eoneem for traditional
rights and more concern for security. And I think that is the heart of
your question.
[In response to another question, Mr. Schlesinger stated:] I do
make a distinction between the material that was in the public domain
and unauthorized by the government (which was, to a large extent,
speculative and had not been confirmed) and the material that the
government had authorized mistakenly. I refer here to two documents
that were mistakenly put on the shelves of the Los Alamos library. You
raise the question "was I concerned?" No, I was not concerned. I was
wrathful. I was appalled. I was angry. This should not surprise one in
retrospect. The system of classification does not work perfectly. (That
is an understatement.) It muddied the case. And not only was I
wrathful, but it also raised a question about the appropriateness of
continuing to proceed with the case.
But our position was that those two documents had been
mistakenly placed on the shelves of Los Alamos Laboratory Library and
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that they were immediately withdrawn from those shelves; that mistakes
have occurred in the classification system before; and that the fact that
somebody might have had a look at them by going to the library did not
mean that we should leave them on the shelves so that—I will not
mention Idi Amin as Judge Warren did—but consider Moammar
Quadaffi. It is interesting. If you had asked us twenty-five years ago if
Libya would get the bomb, the answer would have been, "No." Alas,
twenty-five years later it turns out that Libya, with major outside
assistance, was getting close to being able to provide itself with fissile
material.
I also mentioned in that conversation with Judge Bell and in my
affidavit the episode during World War II in which the Chicago Tribune
had published the fact that the United States had broken the Japanese
code. If the Japanese had known that, they would not have lost the
battle of Midway—which was the turning point not only of the war of
the Pacific, but also of the Second World War. Happily, the Japanese
did not read the Chicago Tribune on that particular day. Similarly, there
may be momentary access to information that should not be released.
That does not mean that because the protective mechanism has broken
down on one occasion that one throws the restraints aside.
[In response to another question, Mr. Schlesinger stated:] 1 think
that the impulse of the Bush Administration would likely be the same as
my impulse twenty-five years ago which was, "can we prevent this?"
As I hope I revealed, I just do not see—given the openness of the
Intemet, the existence of cell phones, the ability to move technical
information over phones—that we have that possibility any more. As I
suggested, I think it may be regrettable that we cannot prevent that. But
I think what I was saying is that the ability to engineer pathogens in
such a way that they can be not treated by the conventional therapies or
antidotes is a high risk to any society and that if we had the ability to
suppress that information, it would be desirable to do so. However, I
see no way that it can be done. The Intemet is too open. China works
hard to prevent information flowing in from abroad through the Intemet.
The Saudi government, which is a fortress of 17th-century religiosity,
works hard to prevent the intmsion from the outside world of the
dangerous ideas of liberalism, but it cannot succeed; it is penetrating.
These new methods of communication have substantially stripped us of
the tools that we might have thought we had in 1947 at the time of the
Atomic Energy Act or even in 1979.
So I think the impulse might be the same, but it is appalling that
the information on engineering pathogens so that they are not stopped
by the conventional therapies cannot be suppressed—but it cannot be.
The only thing that we can do now is to work hard on bio-warfare so
that we have partial remedies on hand when that day arrives.
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[In response to another question, Mr. Schlesinger stated.] We had a
greater, naive trust in the law at that time. And naively we believed if
the government were able to obtain an injunction against publication
that those on the other side would say, "Well, we had that mnnis game.
We lost. Let us move on to something else." What surprised me was
the willingness to start shooting this stuff all over the world to
Australia, to Canada—and I am sure that it would have gone someplace
else. It should not have surprised me. You do not look old enough to
remember the abdication crisis in 1936 of Edward VIII, but the British
had a firm hold on domestic information regarding the scandal of the
King being in love with an American divorcee. As a consequence,
under the rules applied in Britain no mention of this occurred in the
British press. As a result, the Herald Tribune and other papers,
including the Parisian papers, were all flooding into the U.K. in order to
provide the information that the British had effectively suppressed in
their own case. We should have been imaginative enough to think that
that might occur, but we were not. We were just naive in believing in
the efficacy of the law—a lesson for all of you law students.
[In response to another questions, Mr. Schlesinger stated:] As Dean
Rudenstine indicated, the question was buying time. We had thirty or
forty years of President Kennedy's fear that we might have ten nuclear
powers by 1970 and fifteen or twenty by 1975. Remember that in that
period C.P. Snow said that within a decade some of those weapons will
be used. We have not had those weapons used. We were buying time.
Time is not necessarily a concept to which lawyers pay a great deal of
attention; policymakers must pay attention to that. The lawyers tend to
thmk of the logic of the law rather than the time dimension of when
something may occur. The fact that we were successfully delaying the
spread of nuclear weapons struck us as a very valuable achievement.
In 1968,1 wrote a speech for candidate Nixon endorsing the NonProliferation Treaty. While I later became Chairman of the AEG, I had
not been there yet. But I had been the Project Leader at the Rand
Corporation on non-proliferation. It was important for us to delay as
long as possible the spread of this kind of information. Dean
Rudenstine mentioned that the effect was to [delay dissemination]. That
was in Harold Brown's affidavit. Secretary Brown, who was a former
director of the Livermore Laboratory, said that it would remove many
false trails for those would-be proliferators. By having this kind of
information you can go more directly to the achievement of such
weapons because you would have confirmation of which trail was likely
to be successful. We did not want to see that kind of confirmation. Yet,
the biggest revelation took place in August of 1945 that a weapon was
used. That was a big step, and that immediately galvanized the Soviet
Union into competitive activities, although I should not say that.
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because they seem to have had some information about what we were
doing well before that. But they were on the track. We mistakenly
released too much information in 1946 or 1947 in the Smyth report—
which we should not have done. We released information on how to
construct a calutron, which was one of the ways that we sought to
enrich uranium. Then we declassified all of that information on the
premise that we had tried it and it was not a very cost-effective
technique, so why not release it in the open literature? It turned out
some forty years later that Saddam Hussein had a lower interest in costeffective techniques than we did in the late 1940s. So before all of the
latest hullabaloo, in the 1980-1990 period, when he was working on
nuclear weapons, he used calutrons to enrich uranium even though we
had rejected that method as uneconomic. This points to an aspect of
your question that is true: even when you think you are keeping things
pretty well closed down, technology leaks out in small ways, and maybe
in somewhat larger ways. That is the whole history of technology—for
better or worse.
THE CASE
Norman Dorsen^^
During the H-Bomb case, or as I call it. The Progressive case, I
was president of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which
entered the litigation in its midst. By way of introduction, I will confine
myself to two brief comments. First, I would like to pick up the theme
of the Pentagon Papers case, which had been decided eight years
earlier. The ACLU had been very active in that case as an amicus
curiae-, indeed, as ACLU general counsel I appeared before the Second
Circuit in support of the First Amendment claim. Throughout the
Pentagon Papers case, and in the years thereafter, I never heard anyone
at the ACLU—^whether a member of the board or staff—question
whether we were on the right side. It was unanimous that the ACLU
should have been there with the New York Times and the Washington
Post and that what we were doing was critical for First Amendment
principles.
That was not true about The Progressive case. Many members of
the ACLU, including some board members, had doubts about our
position, mainly for the reasons that Dean Rudenstine and Secretary
Schlesinger stated regarding nuclear proliferation. Soon after the
15 Frederick I. and Grace A. Stokes Professor of Law, New York University School of Law;
former President of the American Civil Liberties Union.
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ACLU entered the case, I spoke in New Haven to an ACLU chapter.
Many people said, "Are we sure we're on the right side?" or "Isn't this a
great danger to the world?" Among others, the erratic African dictator,
Idi Amin, was mentioned as someone who would be able to destroy
much of the world with the H-bomb. I was very surprised to hear such
questions from an ACLU group. Thus, even the strongest defenders of
the First Amendment had a certain nervousness about the ACLU
position. The case was very serious business.
My other comment is more personal. It concerns Bruce Ennis, the
lawyer who, as ACLU legal director, was the ACLU chief counsel
during The Progressive case and a key lawyer in the litigation.
Tragically, Bruce died a few years ago. He and I discussed The
Progressive case many times because, by then, I was president of the
organization and this was a high-profile matter with high stakes for the
public and for the ACLU. In my opinion, Bruce Ennis was probably the
greatest staff lawyer that the ACLU ever developed throughout its
history. He was brilliant, sophisticated, articulate, diligent, and
collegial. If I were in legal trouble, Bruce would have been the person I
would have gone to. There were, of course, many great outside lawyers
who did part-time work for the ACLU, including Clarence Darrow,
Arthur Garfield Hays, Osmond Fraenkel, and for a brief period Ruth
Bader Ginsburg. But on the fulltime ACLU staff, in over eighty years
there was no greater civil liberties lawyer than Bruce Ennis. It was an
enormous blow to many people and to civil liberties when he died.
Bruce's only serious competitor as the greatest lawyer the ACLU
has developed is Professor Burt Neubome, my colleague at N.Y.U. Law
School. I have spoken to him about this, and he said, "Look, I've
worked hard for the ACLU and civil liberties, but there was nobody
who could match Bruce Ennis, especially for his remarkable ability to
marshal and build a factual record." Burt was being modest, but his
comment is an indication of the respect in which Bruce Ennis was held.
One of Bruce's closest associates, Charles Sims, is here today. He
worked on The Progressive case and on many other important matters
for fne ACLU, and I am very happy to welcome him.
Now to the three panelists: The first is Robert Cattanach, a partner
in Dorsey and Whitney. He is one of the leading lawyers of that firm
and has worked on important telecommunications cases and many other
regulatory issues. Robert is a graduate of Wisconsin Law School with
honors, and a graduate of the Naval Academy. At one time he was
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. He was a lawyer in the
Civil Division of the Department of Justice at the time of The
Progressive case.
The second speaker is Brady Williamson, a partner in the Madison,
Wisconsin law firm of LaFollette, Godfrey and Kahn. The firm has
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important media clients all over the country, including The Progressive,
and, on occasion, the Washington Post and CBS. Mr. Williamson is a
graduate of Georgetown University Law Center. Before law school, he
worked as a reporter for the Kansas City Star and as a documentary
producer for CBS Television.
Frank Tuerkheimer, my former student at NYU, about whom you
have heard, was a law clerk to one of the outstanding federal judges in
the nation, Edward Weinfeld. Frank became an Assistant U.S.
Attorney, an Associate Special Prosecutor at Watergate, and he has
been a professor for many years at the University of Wisconsin Law
School, from which he is visiting Cardozo Law School this academic
year. Frank is the author of many publications and has received many
just honors. He was the U.S. Attorney in Wisconsin when The
Progressive case arose and was litigated.
Robert E. Cattanach^^
1 am going to speak this morning about how the trial team at the
Department of Justice handled this case. With all due respect to
Secretary Schlesinger, we were a little more circumspect about the
likelihood of success—meaning keeping the piece "secret"—at the end
of the day. Our concern was not about the merits of the case; we felt
comfortable that we had a reasonable likelihood of meeting the test,
even under the stringent standard of New York Times. Our biggest
concern, however, was that notwithstanding success in court, the
information would be leaked somehow to another outlet. By seeking an
injunction, we were validating its accuracy and virtually assuring its
notoriety. Up until now, prior similar publications—even those
reasonably close to the mark—had been met with a mere "no
comment."
That said, there was not much discussion beyond raising that
obvious point. The top cabinet officers were aware of these concerns,
and ultimately concluded that the risks of not proceeding outweighed
the risk of verifying the relative accuracy of the article (and there were
many technical errors). The marching orders were given, and I was not
personally uncomfortable with that.
The practical aspects of preparing the case for hearing offer some
insight into the significance of the legal test we had to meet. Let me
start with the affidavits of Secretaries Schlesinger, Vance, and Brown.
These Secretaries were very well respected on both sides of the aisle.

Former Attorney General Assigned to The Progressive case; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil
Division; Partner, Dorsey & Whitney.
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You could not ask for a more impressive array of credible witnesses.
Some have suggested that perhaps Judge Warren was a bit too
deferential to the combined weight carried by the Secretaries of
Defense, State, and Energy. Judge Warren, however, was not swayed
hy position or title. I think he viewed it as a significant commitment by
the United States that we had three extremely capable individuals
putting their own names on the line, saying "This is critically important
to the security of the United States of America" but that alone was not
enough to carry the day.
The specific contents of those affidavits represented the most
challenging part of the case from a trial lawyer's perspective. We had
to demonstrate "direct, immediate, and irreparable harm" in order to
secure a prior restraint of the press. The most that the affidavits could
say, however, was that if this article was published, it could lead to
nuclear proliferation. And if proliferation did occur, it would seriously
and adversely affect the national security of the United States.
The could/would distinction proved to be the battleground in front
of Judge Warren. The defendants properly argued in essence: "The
United States has not demonstrated to you. Judge, direct immediate and
irreparable harm. The affidavits aver only that proliferation could
occur, and that is not enough under the test."
Judge Warren recognized that "direct, immediate and substantial"
is somewhat in the eye of the beholder. Probably the most quoted
example of what would be an appropriate prior restraint—^publishing the
sailing date of transports or the moving of troops—^provides the
Supreme Court's most concrete expression of what would satisfy the
legal standard.
There always existed a logical leap, however, between the practical
example the Court used in Near and the more abstract substantive test
for prior restraint as articulated by the Court in that case. Publishing the
sailing date of a transport is not necessarily direct, immediate and
irreparable harm. It is information that could be acted on by our
enemies. Remember, Near was decided in 1931, shortly after a war in
which the German U-boats were waiting off the East Coast hoping to
intercept our ships. Those U-boats did not have the sophisticated
communications or navigation technology to ensure that a ship sailing
on a particular date would be sunk. They depended on a rough calculus
using presumed speed and direction to plot a course for intercept, and
presumably hoped for favorable conditions (minimum escorts, etc.) for
successful engagement.
Merely improving the odds that the U-boats could sink the
transports does not in a strict logical sense automatically equate to
direct, immediate, and irreparable harm. It certainly could lead to
direct, immediate, and irreparable harm if the information from the
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publication is passed on to the wrong people, and if those wrong people
are in a position to act on it, and if those actions produce a successful
intercept.
That complete scenario, if viewed collectively,
unquestionably would produce direct, immediate and irreparable harm.
But just the mere articulation of that sailing date is not in and of itself
direct, immediate and irreparable harm. It requires a logical sequence
of subsequent events whieh while probable, are by no means certain.
The same held true in the Progressive case. We had on the one
hand a sequence that could lead to nuclear proliferation. While one can
quibble about how likely it might be that the publication of this article
actually would result in nuclear proliferation, it certainly could produce
eonsequences infinitely more sobering than the loss of a single troop
ship. But, just as in the example used by the Supreme Court in Near,
mere publication would not inexorably lead to direet, immediate, and
irreparable harm. It would require also, as in Near, the combination of
other subsequent events, all with varying degrees of probability.
The question thus always becomes one of balancing, whether
anyone likes to admit it or not in the context of the First Amendment.
Judge Warren was a trial judge, in the business of deciding requests for
injunctions, which invariably requires a balancing of harms. One the
one hand, he was looking at the enormous consequences of what might
occur if the article was published. On the other hand, only small
portions of the article would have to be restrained in order to avoid the
potential for significant harm from the publication.
Herein lies the critical aspect of this case from a trial lawyer's
perspective. Judge Warren knew that the Department of Energy had
offered to sit down with the author and publisher to identify the most
sensitive portions in the piece from a nuclear proliferation perspective,
and find some way to "tell the story" without having to disclose this
very technical information. At no time did the United States take the
position that the author could not tell the story that, at least in the
author's mind, nuclear seerecy was a myth. The government was only
seeking to redact key technical and scientific phrases. In that respect,
this case was fundamentally different from the New York TimesPentagon Papers case. Nevertheless, the Progressive and Mr. Morland
declined to engage in any process toward compromise, adopting Justice
Black's absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment.
Judge Warren was then required to weigh national seeurity
concerns about nuclear proliferation against the need to disclose
extremely sensitive technical information which, 1 would respectfully
submit, was to most objective minds at best a footnote to the bigger
"story" Mr. Morland wanted to tell. Frankly, the article easily could
have been published and conveyed the author's message without getting
into the details of the actual secrets themselves. The article did not need
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to include everything the author learned about the actual design aspects
of the H-bomb in order to make its point. One of our key objectives
was to make sure that Judge Warren clearly understood this distinction,
and I personally believe that it formed a substantial part of the basis for
his decision.
Judge Warren recognized that a myopic focus on the terms "direct,
immediate and irreparable" could lead to a misinterpretation of the
standard that the United States Supreme Court intended to establish in
Near. In that sense. Judge Warren grasped the essence of the policy
tensions inherent in all of the First Amendment cases, and balanced
those policies in a very practical way to decide the Progressive case.
As you all probably know, the case ultimately became moot. The
essence of the article was published elsewhere, and the United States
had no real option other than to dismiss the case. Before that occurred,
however, there was a lot of consternation within the Department of
Justice as it became increasingly evident during the pendency of the
case that more and more parts of this sensitive technical material were
probably already in the public domain—albeit not in a context that an
uninformed reader would readily piece together. As this case drew
more attention it spawned a form of academic challenge to certain
physicists, prompting them to search for pieces of the technical
information in the public domain, which, but for the litigation,
otherwise would have passed unnoticed. Each time some small piece of
the mosaic was discovered by a scientist sympathetic to the author, his
lawyers would promptly file a motion to dismiss as moot, and the
govemment then had to explain why that small piece did not in itself
disclose the secret of the H-bomb.
Ultimately, the govemment had to abandon the case because
keeping the secret—defined as the critical mass of technical information
sufficiently accurate and meaningful to assist other nations intent on
obtaining a nuclear capability—^was a cause not well served by the
litigation. Not because the legal theory behind the case was weak, but
because the case was focusing too much attention on the topic.
Specifically, the case was highlighting various technical details found in
the public domain that—but for the ongoing litigation—could have been
dismissed with a mere "no comment." In hindsight, had the United
States been able to foresee the constant stream of technical sniping by
very able physicists upset with the mere specter of a prior restraint, I
suspect a "no comment" response at the outset of the case might have
been given considerably more thought.
What have we leamed? Two things; One, the United States must
exercise its prosecutorial discretion very carefully. Sworn statements
by the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Energy that a potential
publication poses a severe threat to the national security can place an
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enormous burden on a federal district judge. Unless exercised with
great restraint, this powerful tool can quickly lose its credibility and
thus utility, as we witnessed in the aftermath of the New York Times
case. Second, whatever the challenges may have been of keeping any
information truly "secret" twenty-five years ago, the notion of keeping
anything secret once it has been disclosed in any context is virtually
impossible in today's internet world.
For better or worse, to the extent that publication of information
threatens the security of the United States, the security interests of the
country are best served—and as a practical matter depend upon—the
sound judgment of responsible journalists.
Brady Williamson^''
When this ease arose much like a summer storm in the spring of
1979, I was one year removed from Georgetown Law School, and a
very young associate at a very small law firm in Madison, Wisconsin.
When I left Georgetown to go to Madison, some of my colleagues
reacted with amusement. What a wonderful place to live—the capitol,
the lakes, the university—^but, of course, you will not have cases as
interesting as the ones we have on Wall Street, or in the big
Washington, D.C. firms. I still remember those words now twenty-five
years later.
This distinguished law school has brought us together for an
anniversary; it is an anniversary of a lawsuit about a magazine article.
Anniversaries of almost any kind present an occasion to remark on what
has changed and what remains the same. So, I will talk briefly about
what has and what has not changed.
Changed: Idi Amin, the ruthless dictator cited as a potential
beneficiary of the secrets of the article, is long gone. Although, as
Secretary Schlesinger rightly notes, others have replaced him as icons of
terror. Other principals in the lawsuit have passed away as well. I think
it appropriate, as Mr. Dorsen did, to note a few of them as well. Irwin
Knoll, the editor of the magazine, has died. Gordon Sinykin, who was
the senior partner at that small Madison law firm, and was for years the
magazine's chairman, has passed on as well. And Judge Robert
Warren, who first issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and then
an injunction, and who then deelined to dissolve the injunction after it
became clear that the secrets really were not secret at all, has too passed
on. Nuclear proliferation remains a transcending issue for the world,
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although it is impossible not to note that the nations who held a
thermonuclear (not nuclear) monopoly twenty-five years ago still hold
it, and that, probably, no one else has joined it. Whatever the legal or
journalistic vices or virtues of that article twenty-five years ago, I do not
think anyone has ever argued that it helped anyone make, develop, or
improve a weapon. And the two laws that were at stake in that case
remain with us—the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and, interestingly
enough, the Espionage Act of 1917, which was also invoked. Although,
as the late Gordon Sinykin remarked to Irwin Knoll, the good news is
that there is no longer a death penalty.
On the subject of change, what of The Progressive magazine itself?
Well, the magazine itself will soon celebrate its one-hundredth birthday
as the oldest political journal in America. It is alive and well,
publishing in its still iconoclastic and irreverent fashion, from Madison,
Wisconsin. And in the last three years its circulation has doubled to
about sixty-five thousand—^perhaps coincident with the current
administration, perhaps not.
Bob Cattanach, Dean Rudenstine, and Secretary Schlesinger each
remarked on the Internet and how it is almost impossible to conceive of
a case like this arising again. Because today—with the press of a
button—information, drawings, diagrams, and schematics can all be
disseminated, not just across the street, or in a magazine with thirty
thousand subscribers, but around the world. I think that in that sense, it
is an anachronistic case. But then again, so was Near v. Minnesota.
Some things that are implicated by this case remain unchanged,
notwithstanding the revolution in technology. The first and most
important is the tension between the First Amendment and national
security. Not only is it inevitable in American democracy, it is
indispensable to American democracy. I think we have also seen in the
last few years a continued willingness, at least initially, to accept
assertions made by the government and to accept them at face value.
The public, the media, and the judiciary remain willing, at least initially,
to accept representations made by the government about national
security. Yet 1 think we have also seen, in the last two years, that that
initial willingness is followed almost inexorably by skepticism, by
doubt, by questioning. The claims made by the government are
presumptively made in good faith, and I have no doubt today, and 1
really had no doubt twenty-five years ago, that the government's claims
were made in good faith. But those claims, almost inevitably, cannot
bear their own weight—^not because they are the product of deliberate
deception, but precisely because they are made in good faith, albeit
made only from the government's perspective.
Secretary Schlesinger and Bob Cattanach both remarked on "the
magazine's unwillingness to cooperate" with the government. The
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magazine did not, could not, would not cooperate with the government
any more than any of the other great institutions of this country that
practice the profession of journalism can be expected to cooperate with
the government. It is not the role of the news media to cooperate with
anyone, least of all the government. And again, I submit that is not only
inevitable in American democracy, but also indispensable to American
democracy.
Several other points are worth noting, because they have not
changed, and will not change, notwithstanding improvements in
technology. Consider the challenge to the legal system and to justice
itself that is presented when you have a conflict between First
Amendment rights and national security. If I am not mistaken, the U.S.
Supreme Court will hear no fewer than three cases in the next term that
test this relationships between the national government, the interests of
national security, and the Bill of Rights.
Bob Cattanach mentioned the affidavits by the cabinet Secretaries
that were presented in support of the motion for injunctive relief and
Bob, as a good trial lawyer, also mentioned that they really thought they
had some pretty solid, compelling evidence with three affidavits.
Imagine our position on the other side, when we received affidavits
from the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and other cabinet officers.
Of course, the problem is inherent in the form: an affidavit, which can
only get you so far in court, is, by definition, not tested by the great
engine of cross examination. An affidavit cannot be. In a national
security case, the affiants become even more removed from the normal
fact finding process. We have seen that use of affidavits again in the
last six months or year in this country, when the government—no doubt
motivated by good faith—has made representations that are, at least on
paper and for the immediate time, irrefutable.
In that same vein, let me add one more point about the lawyerclient relationship. In The Progressive ease, the lawyers for the
defendants were unable to share important facts about the ease with
their own clients. All of the lawyers voluntarily (to be sure) accepted
the review that comes with something called a "Q clearance," which
involves access to nuclear information. Irwin Knoll and the others
connected with the magazine refused to submit themselves to a security
clearance. As a result, we were unable to share information with them.
Today, we may have the converse—clients unable to eommunicate with
lawyers, or to communicate with their lawyers only on a very limited
basis. This is another example of the challenges to the legal system
when national security and the legal process collide.
One final point must be made about the challenges presented to
judges and the judiciary. Whether the First Amendment is absolute or
not, or whether the First Amendment admits of minor exceptions, the
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tension between the national government and the news media cannot be
resolved by balance. Because if the test is "shall we balance one against
the other?" the result inevitably will be the result reached by Judge
Warren. In the face of those well grounded, well meaning affidavits
fi-om much of the President's cabinet, the fate of a small ideological
magazine in Madison, Wisconsin does not fare well in that balance.
The burdens that the law places on a prior restraint are massive. I thinic
the lesson for today and the future is that we hope that judges, and
federal judges particularly, will put as much weight on the words of the
Pentagon Papers decision as they do on the words of the affidavits that
are presented in good faith by the government of the United States.
I will finish with a brief anecdote about Judge Warren, and a
quotation fi"om one of his decisions. Interviewed twenty years after the
fact. Judge Warren is reported to have said that he would still stand by
his decision, but that he did believe that the govemment, intentionally or
not, had misled him a bit. He expressed disappointment that the
govemment did not pursue the case to the end or at least to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In other words, he said that
he still felt that he had done the right thing, given the balance. In 1991,
I argued another case in fi-ont of Judge Warren, and it had to do with a
speech code that the University of Wisconsin had imposed on its student
body. The speech code permitted the University to punish students for
using language that we would characterize as insensitive, intemperate,
even bigoted. Students were actually suspended for using this kind of
offensive language. Judge Warren, in one of his last decisions and
without much hesitation, stmck down that speech code. Let me
conclude with the words from this decision, which I wish that he had
written twenty-five years ago. This is from Judge Warren:
The founding fathers of this nation produeed a remarkable document
in the Constitution, but it was ratified only with the promise of the
Bill of Rights. The First Amendment is central to our concept of
freedom. The God given, unalienable rights that the infant nation
rallied to in the Declaration can be preserved only if those rights are
applied rigorously. Freedom of speech is almost absolute in our
land, but content based prohibitions, such as the University rule,
however well intended, simply cannot survive the scrutiny which our
Constitution demands.'^

18 The UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 774 F Supp
1163, 1181 (D. Wis. 1991).
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Frank TuerkheimeF^
I would like to present a slightly different perspeetive on The
Progressive case as it unfolded twenty-five years ago. I was the United
States Attorney in the Western District of Wisconsin at the time.
Parenthetically, when we left New York City for Wisconsin almost ten
years earlier, several friends warned me that nothing important ever
happened there.
Bob Cattanach and two of his colleagues came to Madison on a
Thursday evening and were ready to ask for injunctive relief against The
Progressive magazine to stop it from publishing the Morland article. I
had no advance knowledge that the case was coming and so, of course,
was totally unfamiliar with it. At the time, there was only one judge in
the Western District of Wisconsin, Judge James Doyle; the case would
normally have been heard by him. I knew he would ask many
questions, and I felt that the government's interest in the case being
presented effectively would be better served if these attorneys, who had
spent himdreds of hours in preparing for it, were to appear for the
United States, instead of someone such as myself who had spent less
than an hour getting briefed on it. While I would have argued it if they
had asked, I suggested they do so, and they agreed.
At this stage, I had no hesitation in advocating the case for the
government. The ease for injunctive relief was based on three concepts:
(1) that there was technical information relating to thermonuclear
weaponry in the article; (2) that this technical information was not in the
public domain; and (3) that dissemination of this information would
severely injure the United States in its effort to curtail the spread of
thermonuclear weaponry. As it turned out. Judge Doyle had a prior
connection with The Progressive, and so he recused himself from the
case. It was then assigned to Judge Warren in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, who was to sit by designation in the Western District. Judge
Warren scheduled a hearing for a temporary restraining order, a form of
injimctive relief available before the request for a preliminary injunction
is considered, for the following day.
I thought that since I was going to become involved in the case, it
would be a good idea for me to leam a little bit about it. So, on that
Friday morning, while Bob Cattanach and his colleagues were asking
for a temporary restraining order from Judge Warren, I reviewed the
file.
One of the first documents I looked at was the affidavit of John
Griffin, the head of the classification section of the Department of
19 U.S. Attorney involved in The Progressive ease, Western District of Wisconsin; Visiting
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
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Energy, whose affidavit established a key link in the case for injunctive
relief: that the restricted data in the article was not in the public domain.
The affidavits from the Secretaries of Defense and State, which we have
heard about, established the injury to U.S. foreign policy objectives
should the article be published in its planned form.^o Nevertheless,
those conclusions were based on the unavailability to the public of
technical data in the article. The Griffin affidavit supplied this critical
predicate. Mr. Griffin, in his affidavit, swore that he and his office were
abreast of public domain articles relating to the design, operation,
storage, and employment of nuclear weapons and that, to his
knowledge, the restricted data information contained in the manuscript
concerning the design and operation of a thermonuclear weapon was not
in the public domain.
With the Griffin affidavit in mind, I started to read the article.
Restricted data, namely those parts of the article which Griffin swore
were not in the public domain, were boxed, and marked RD. Not
long after having started the article and having seen what was marked
restricted data, I was, to put it mildly, jolted. I saw that there was
information in those boxes that was not new to me; in fact, I had known
it for literally twenty-five years. As a teenager in the mid 1950s, 1 was
interested in atomic physics and had read avidly in the area. Among the
information marked "restricted data" was information I had learned
from books taken out of the public library in the early/mid 1950s, here
in New York City on St. Nicholas Avenue and 161st Street. What kind
of things am I talking about? For example, a thermonuclear weapon is
detonated by the energy that comes from a fission bomb. The bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and conventionally (and somewhat
imprecisely in a thermonuclear age) known as atomic bombs, when they
explode, release energy which is the trigger that starts the process that
fuses hydrogen. The resulting release of energy from the fusion of
hydrogen into a heavier element is what is conventionally known as the
hydrogen bomb. Griffin marked that statement as restricted and swore
that it was not in the public domain. As I continued to read, other bits
of restricted data were also familiar to me, and therefore, obviously in
the public domain.
I then went to court and got there just as Judge Warren granted the
temporary restraining order. (He was later to issue a prelimina.ry
injunction.) Bob and his two colleagues were elated, and while
congratulating each other on their success, along comes Mr. Good News
to say to them, "Hey, we've got a problem." I told them that there was
material in the article marked as restricted data which was in the public
20 These impressive affidavits and ensuing publication of the Morland article
notwithstanding, in the twenty-five years since publication, no new nation has joined the
exclusive thermonuclear club.
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domain and that the classification was way too over-broad. 1 can only
describe their reaction with the oxymoronic statement that they looked
at me with what I would call respectful disdain. I siuely could
understand that. Who was 1? Not a scientist, just a lawyer from
Madison, Wisconsin. On the other side was the whole apparatus of the
Department of Energy. 1 could not fault them, not for a moment.
Of course, they were right; there was no way our position on the
science could change because of anything I said. Then, over the
following weekend, I went to the physics library of the University of
Wisconsin, and started xeroxing articles from books in the library that
contained the same information which 1 had read in the article and
which had been marked restricted data. On Monday, 1 sent these xerox
copies to the team in Washington, annotating the articles to the
restricted data boxes in the Morland article. This showed, of course,
that the assertion that the restricted data was not in the public domain
was inaccurate, but now it was not just my say-so based on recollections
of what I had read long ago. Ironically, one of the xeroxed articles was
published by the government of India. India was one of the few
countries with the scientific and industrial capacity to develop a
thermonuclear weapon, and therefore, a country to which we did not
want data relating to thermonuclear weaponry to spread.^' And the
Department of Energy marked as restricted data information which the
government of India itself has published! Accessible in a university
library, no less!
There was, 1 am sure, a reclassification of the article after 1 sent off
my packet, reducing the restricted data to a degree beyond that
information 1 had provided.
But given this rather imfortunate
introduction to the case, I ended up not playing any kind of role in it.
And what 1 had done in my very elementary and crude way is what the
defense in the case was to do with far more technical and scientific
assistance as the case progressed.
On two different occasions, 1 urged that the case be dropped. The
first time 1 wrote a letter to Attorney General Griffin Bell after the
defense had in fact shown that virtually all of the information in the
article was already in the public domain. General Bell had spoken to a
conference of U.S. Attorneys and had told us that when we initiate civil
litigation, we should be aware of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which required that assertions, legal and factual, in pleadings
must be well-grounded. I reminded him of what he had told us—
21 Judge Warren, during an oral argument, observed it would not be a good thing if Idi Amin
had a hydrogen bomb. (Idi Amin was at the time a ruthless dictator in Uganda.) This catchy
statement, the truth of which could not be denied, had no basis in reality since Idi Amin totally
lacked the scientific and engineering capacity to do anything with the data contained in the
Morland article. The observation, however, was quoted extensively. Who could disagree with it?
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probably a bad tactical approach—and suggested that if we would not
bring the case on the basis of what we then knew, then we ought not to
continue it since in a sense the case was brought anew each day of
restraint. He rejected my argument and to my deep chagrin, did so on
the ground that I was reacting to pressure from others in what he called
the most liberal community in the country. The truth, of course, is that
no one pressured me.
Some time later, I tried again, this time by speaking to all of the
key players in the Justice Department about why the case should be
dropped. I well remember the interrogation that Deputy Attorney
General Civiletti put me through—^by far and away the most
intellectually challenging experience in my four years as a United States
Attorney. But while everyone else was convinced. Attorney General
Bell remained adamant. He had made a commitment to Secretary of
Energy Schlesinger that the case would go ahead and felt that he had to
live up to that commitment. The case did go ahead until its final and
inevitable denouement when the essence of the Morland article was
published later in 1979. This led to the withdrawal of the preliminary
injunction, the first such restraint on publication ever issued in our
history.
What is the moral that emerges from this case? The moral that I
would draw is that the government, specifically the Department of
Justice, has to question a case very seriously before it undertakes action
that would lead to a restriction on speech. As I hope is clear, I am not
an absolutist who believes that there can never be a legitimate restraint
on speech. I believed in the case as it was originally presented. I
believe it is a legitimate function of government to look out for national
security interests and in the rare occasion when national security
demands a constraint on speech, the Department of Justice should
litigate in an effort to get it. But when that happens, the Department of
Justice is under an acute obligation to look at the case critically, to
obtain the kind of assurance that any counsel would want before
advising a client to undertake a position in litigation that puts the client
out on a dangerous limb. In the effort to enjoin publication of the
Morland article, the Department should have had its case, all parts,
including the Griffin affidavit, checked by a knowledgeable, objective
source. This would have shown that Griffin was fundamentally wrong
and that a case built on his misinformation was not the right way to go.
The end result without such a review was that national security was
not furthered by the initiation of the law suit. The case quite naturally
spawned a major focus on what was in the public domain that related to
thermonuclear weaponry and in case any nation did not know where to
look, it now did. While I am sure that the Griffin affidavit was sworn to
in good faith, the affidavit, nevertheless was inaccurate; the inaccuracy
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was not at all far beneath its surface and hence ascertainable upon any
kind of objective and knowledgeable review.
Every attorney in the Department of Justice starts his or her job by
taking an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and to
defend the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
This oath demands great deference both to client agencies asserting
potential injury to national security, but also to the constraints on
government power found in the Constitution. Whether that is the way
attorneys in the Department of Justice act now is an important question.
1 have my doubts, but hope I am wrong.
THE ARTICLE
Howard MorlancP^
The Progressive case was more about images than text, so I will
use a lot of images in my talk, including stage props.
My assignment is to answer the two questions on the magazine
cover: the H-bomb secret—how we got, why we are telling it. I will
start with the why part.
I am a nuclear weapons abolitionist, for practical as well as moral
reasons. 1 want my country to renounce nuclear weapons, unilaterally,
and destroy its nuclear arsenal. We should then use all our political and
economic power—military if necessary—to promote a world-wide ban
on nuclear weapons.
Despite our present preoccupation with low-tech terrorism, nuclear
weapons are still the only threat to our national security. I believe they
are entirely useless for us, and we are unlikely eliminate their threat if
we continue to operate from our present position of nuclear hypocrisy.
With opinions like that, 1 am precisely the type person the First
Amendment was intended to protect: a political advocate whose ideas
are unpopular with the general public and threatening to the
government.
But why tell the H-bomb secret?
In 1978,1 was giving lectures to environmental activists who were
protesting nuclear power. 1 wanted to call their attention to the bomb.
To illustrate my lectures, 1 thought a model of a nuclear weapon, like
the one beside me now, would be useful. I planned to open it like a
book and reveal its secrets, describe its power, make it real.
For example, three nuclear warheads the size of this trash can
could flatten Manhattan Island south of Central Park. Anything left
22 Howard Morland is a free-lance writer who lives in Virginia.
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standing would be a tall cinder; no people would survive. This is the
actual size of a half-megaton warhead, and every Trident submarine
carries a hundred of them. A visual aid like this would help demystify
the bomb, show it to be a product of industry, an assemblage of
components. That was the first why: to promote nuclear disarmament,
visually.
When it came time to tell the secret. The Progressive'?, editors and
1 were confident that, reason two, it would cause no harm, and, reason
three, the First Amendment would protect us from draconian
punishment.
Speaking of punishment, on easels at the front of the room I have a
story from the Sunday Times of London, October 1986. It is an article
on the Israeli nuclear arsenal, written with information provided by
Israeli bomb technician Mordechai Vanunu. His punishment for those
three pages of newsprint was eleven years in solitary confinement at
Ashkelon Prison in Israel; his eighteen-year sentence ends next month.
In this country, with its tradition of free speech, supported by the
Constitution, we did not expect that sort of thing to happen to us, or to
any of our sources.
I mention Vanunu in part as a tribute to the late Sam Day, the
editor who hired me for The Progressive assignment. The plight of
Mordechai Vanunu was Sam's final crusade.
There is a fourth answer to the "why" question which 1 will
mention later.
How did 1 get the secret?
In January of 1978, while speaking to a physics seminar at the
University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa, I asked if anybody knew the Hbomb secret. A student from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, answered,
"gamma rays from the fission trigger set off the fusion part of the bomb.
[A]t Oak Ridge they machine the inside of the bomb casing to make it
reflect gamma rays."
In journalism they say, "Your mom says she loves you? Check it
out." One part checked out. 1 learned that Oak Ridge has the nation's
largest H-bomb component factory: the Y-12 plant.
1 looked up "fission" in the encyclopedia and found that gamma
rays are the first form of energy produced by fission. They are only
four percent of the total energy, but four percent of a large number can
still be a large number. Lawyers do not understand this fact, which is
why they charge thirty-three percent. Real estate people have a better
understanding of how to get rich on small percentages.
Neutrons carry off another three percent. They sustain the chain
reaction, but when that finishes there are lots of spare neutrons flying
around.
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Ninety-three percent of fission energy is in the form of fission
fragment motion, which I assumed would be less useful because I
overlooked the fact that all that energy would quickly become x-ray
energy via the bremsstrahlung effect. I was aware that a nuclear fireball
is essentially x-ray heated air, but I did not realize the x-rays would
develop soon enough to dominate events inside the bomb casing, as
well as in the surrounding countiyside.
In my ignorance, I assumed the coupling energy between the
fission bomb and the fusion bomb would be either gamma rays or
neutrons.
I looked up "H-bomb" in two encyclopedias. World Book and
Americana. The World Book article was written by Ralph Lapp, who
did not know the secret in spite of having published more words on the
H-bomb than anybody else. His article was accompanied by unsigned
drawings of obscure origin, which Lapp had never seen. They showed
hydrogen fusion fuel—tritium and deuterium—surrounded by
exploding plutonium fission bombs. This would obviously work, but
there was no mechanism to compress, or implode, all those fission
bombs and set them off, xmless the entire bomb was somehow to be
imploded.
The Americana article was by Edward Teller, father of the Hbomb, and its unsigned drawings were likewise not from the author.
The Americana scheme showed a fission bomb and a fusion bomb
inside an otherwise empty uranium bottle. This arrangement was
consistent with the gamma ray idea, but the drawing was too simple to
be the whole story. For example, the neutrons from the fission trigger
were needed to convert lithium-6 into tritium for fusion, but the heat
(i.e., gamma rays, I thought) would get there first and disperse the
fusion fuel before the lithium was converted.
I later learned that the fission bomb trigger in this drawing is called
the "primary" and the lithium deuteride charge is called the
"secondary." Knowing those terms would have told me that this
Americana drawing is basically correct.
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HYDROGEN BOMB
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My resources included interviews with five luminaries, none of
whom was both helpful and knew the secret. Ralph Lapp and Philip
Morrison were both Manhattan Project veterans who quit the business
before the H-bomb was developed in 1950. Morrison, who was willing
to spend hours with me in his MIT office, reported that Herb York had
once told him he could figure out the secret if he spent a year thinking
about it. York himself met with me several times at a Pentagon City
restaurant. He seemed amused by my interest in H-bombs but warned
me not to try to build one. Teller was on record in favor of
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declassifying the whole thing, but when he learned that I wanted to ban
the bomb he identified me as his political enemy and made vague
threats against me.
George Rathjens is noteworthy in this list. For years, he had
challenged his political science graduate students at MIT to figure out
the secret, and none had done it. I was not enrolled in his program, but I
accepted his challenge. More about Rathjens later.
1 had many printed resources and, finally, in the spring of 1978, an
imexpected assignment from The Progressive magazine to visit the Hbomb factories and take the unclassified guided tours. With a fivehundred dollar travel allowance, I managed to see six of the seven
component factories—all but the final assembly plant in Amarillo,
Texas—and learn everything about them except what they make. For
that part, I was still on my own.
On a swing through Boston, I showed my "Segmented Worm"
drawing to Professor Rathjens. He said, "I don't think this will work."
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My next hypothesis was the "Keyhole" drawing, which used a
Plutonium spark plug to bridge the gap between the primary and
secondary. My first chance to show it to anyone was November 1978 in
Los Alamos. I had finished interviewing a Manhattan Project veteran
about his work on wartime criticality experiments. 1 started to pull out
the keyhole drawing, but thinking it was probably wrong anyway, I
showed him the Teller Americana drawing instead. Lucky choice. I
asked if he could add some detail to it, so 1 could trace the components
back to their factories.
He pointed to the space between the primary and the secondary and
said, "you'd need something in there to keep the neutrons off the
secondary."
Bingo. It all came to me in a flash. Of course! If it is not
neutrons, it must be gamma rays after all, just like the Alabama student
said. While he looked at the Teller Americana drawing, 1 was holding
the Lapp World Book drawing. If the fins were removed, it became a
uranium bottle with a pyramid of uranium at the top, a neutron blocker.
If 1 used the Lapp bomb as a secondary for the Teller bomb, 1 would
have a bottle within a bottle. The outer bottle would fill up with gamma
rays.

[Vol. 26:4

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

1372

Fission-bomb

triggsf
TNT

U-23S

" . . . you'd need
someihing in
there to keep
the neutrons off
the secondary."

Lithium-6

<i«ut«rl<l6(LrD|
U-23$ casing

Vernon Kendrick

Americana

Edward Teller

Fission-bomb

HYDROGEN BOMB

trigger
TNT
Uranium
Casing

U-23S

Lithium-6
d«ut«rl<l*(U*D)

U-23$ casing

w

B e T ytil I if m- P o I oriii um Core

Americana

Edward Teller

WoridBook

Ralph Lapp

1 recalled that radiation pressure bends the tail of a comet.
1 knew the Lapp World Book bomb needed to be imploded to set
off its plutonium triggers, and radiation pressure inside the outer bottle
could do the job. That was the secret. Gamma rays and radiation
pressure.
Barely containing my excitement, I showed him the other drawing
and suggested it might make a good secondary. He pointed to the
plutonium balls and replied, "They don't use spark plugs anymore." So
they, too, have a name.
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I went back to my sketchbook, and by December I had a drawing
suitable for publication in The Progressive. In January, I sent it along
with a manuscript to Sam Day. In February, I learned that Sam had sent
a copy of the drawings to George Rathjens at MIT, who had sent them
to Washington for classification. Apparently, I had earned a passing
grade on the Rathjens challenge, but at the potential cost of losing my
right to tell the story.
In response to my alarm, Sam and editor Erwin Knoll promised to
fight any censorship all the way to the Supreme Court, and to defy the
court in the end if they lost. They would cover all my legal expenses. It
would make a great test case, they said. With some apprehension, I
signed on as a First Amendment defendant. John Scopes, the evolution
teacher in the Tennessee monkey trial, had been one of my childhood
heroes.
That was the fourth "why": to provoke a test case and challenge
the constitutionality of the Atomic Energy Act.
Because we chose not to seek security clearances, the case soon
put the editors and me on the outside of a security fence, separating us
from our own lawyers, who then became potential sources of
information for me.
It got interesting right away.
In a secret, in camera, brief submitted on March 21, defense
lawyer Earl Munson stated, "As near as we can tell,"—^that is a
Midwestern legal phrase—"there are three concepts in the Morland
article which the plaintiff contends are 'Restricted Data.'" He listed
them as: (1) reflection, (2) radiation pressure, and (3) compression. All
three are illustrated on the magazine cover.
The next day, John Griffin, the Energy Department's classification
specialist, accepted the three-concepts idea, but offered his own three
concepts: (1) separation of stages, which Munson did not think was
secret; (2) radiation coupling, which combined my erroneous
descriptions of reflection and radiation pressure into something more
vague and thus more accurate; and (3) compression, which Griffin
accepted without change.
These three concepts then became the core of the case. I first
learned about them in September, after the case was dropped, when 1
read redacted versions of the in camera documents and hearing
transcripts. In the meantime, I picked up on the notion that errors in my
description of the H-bomb were a key feature of the case.
I started a list of potential corrections.
The first correction came with an article in the Economist
magazine which pointed out that the tritium booster charge was
deployed in gaseous, not hydride form. If that was true, the lithium
tritide in my secondary was wrong, so I took it out.
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Detonation Sequence

On February 16, 1979, MIT F^rofessor Cieorgc Rathjens
sent these drawings to Washington. The government
declared them secret and filed a prior restraint lawsuit.

New So//dari/y (ZaRouc/ie) 1976

Uwe Parpart

Next, an anonymous envelope arrived from the Naval Research
Laboratory in Washington, containing a 1976 clipping from Hew
Solidarity newspaper, a free tabloid handed out at airports by Lyndon
La Rouche's zombie-like followers. The article, by one Uwe Parpart,
included an H-bomb diagram similar to mine, but with x-, not gamma,
rays driving the implosion and a fissionable spark plug in the secondary.
The anonymous leaker vouched for the accuracy of this diagram, so I
put the spark plug back in my own diagram.
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Then in May, a researcher working for the American Civil
Liberties Union discovered UCRL-4725, a Livermore Lab report on
Operation Redwing, June 1956. It was sitting on an open shelf at the
Los Alamos Library; he mailed copies to newspapers. It contained no
drawings or explanations, only cryptic references to design concepts
and test results, but the event made headlines and prompted a round of
political cartoons.
Most of the document concerned a three-stage device called
Bassoon which was tested twice during Redwing. Its third, or tertiary,
stage was rated at twenty megatons per meter; that is a megaton for
every two inches of length. I have mentioned what three, half-megaton
bombs would do to Manhattan Island. Bassoon was later deployed as
the twenty-five megaton Mark-41 bomb. We actually had these things
flying around in the 1950s, fully assembled and ready to drop.
They have long since been retired in favor of smaller bombs.
The government argued that UCRL-4725 did not reveal the Hbomb secret and that a reader would need my article as a guide to
understanding it. Legally, it was a "let's see if the judge'll buy this
one" type of argument. It worked, and the injunction held for another
four months.
One thing I learned from the document was that the exotic plastic
foam, which is made at the Kansas City plant, does not go inside the
secondary. It fills the radiation charmel outside the secondary, so I
made that change in the drawing. At first, I thought the plastic was just
a packaging material, but in August, Chuck Hansen circulated an open
letter to Senator Percy of Illinois, which outlined his speculations about
the H-bomb secret.

The Hansen Letter

fission tdgg^irs
These efements are...supported bya casing "filling" of poli^srtyrene or pofyuretfiane team
jreweatedljyUCflt-4?2&. Odcago ^Js^Tlmes^ May 18.

Wrong
Two Primaries
Ho Neutron Blocker
No Spark Plug

Right
^^Ra^ario^mpl^on
^^^!ocatloa^oSSiP
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The Hansen letter contained a number of obvious errors: two
primaries, which would never work because of timing issues; no
neutron blocker; and no spark plug. It did give a vague explanation of
radiation implosion, and he got the location of the plastic foam right.
To accompany his very crude drawing, Hansen included the following
line of text: "These elements are supported by a casing filling of
polystyrene or polyethylene foam (revealed by UCRL-4725, Chicago
Sun Times, May 18, 1979)." Hansen identified the foam as a packaging
item, as I did, but I soon learned that defense experts were making a big
deal about the location of the foam. I suspected it was more than
packaging.
To everyone's surprise, the government took the Hansen letter as
an excuse to throw in the towel, declare the case moot, and give the goahead for publication of my article.
From redacted court documents, 1 learned that the plastic foam
plays an active role in radiation implosion, and, finally, that radiation is
"channeled" not "reflected."
Thus, all my thoughts about gamma rays, reflection, and radiation
pressure—which the government had tried to suppress—^were wrong
anyway. My list of significant corrections was published as a full-page
Errata in The Progressive one month after the unaltered article came out
in the November 1979 issue. The government did not see the Errata
before publication, and no legal action was taken.
Cori-ections
1. TritiumS as gas, not hydride.
2. No tritiumS in secondary.
3. U-235S spark plug in
secondary; x- not gamma rays.
4. No plastic foam Pl inside
secondary.

Win

5. Plastic foam filler^in
radiation channel, with blast
shield B.
6. Channel filler has active role in
implosion: "matter pressure,"
not "radiation pressure."
7. Radiation is "channeled," not
"reflected,"

With the corrected diagram, I now had what I needed to build the
stage prop and to cormect the components to the appropriate corporate
logos. Within a few years, grassroots activists had driven all the H-
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bomb contractors out of the business, forcing the Energy Department to
find new contractors to run its factories. One of the factories, the
Rockwell-operated Rocky Flats plant near Denver, has been shut down
for good, effectively shutting down the production line.
We have not banned the bomb yet, but we do have this tangible
result of the exercise of free speech by citizens.

ia 19%.

A modern thermonuclear warhead - the W87
Fission trigger

(DT) gas

roam

Uranlum-238 case

Explosion process: The compression of plutonium with a chemical
explosive (above, left) starts a fission explosion that, in turn, is boosted
by the fusion of DT gas. X-rays then compress the second component,
causing a larger fission/fusion.

(c) 1995 US Hews & World Report, by Timotl^ ito, Robert Kemp, and Richard Gage
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In the meantime, journalists and activists have continued to publish
illustrated explanations of how H-bombs work, such as: U.S. News and
World Report in 1995, the San Jose Mercury News in 1999, and
Greenpeace on its website.
The Greenpeace drawing is imique. Every other drawing in this
presentation originates outside the secrecy wall, as some artist's attempt
to illustrate a concept. The Greenpeace Rawing is said to come from a
British nuclear weapons manual and to depict an actual weapon.
Activists like to treat drawings like this in the spirit of a "wanted"
poster. If you see one of these, call a weapons inspector. Do not
attempt to make a citizen's arrest.
high explosive shell
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SHARING INFORMATION ON WEAPONRY WITH THE PUBLIC THEN AND
Now
Gary MilholliiP^
I am pleased to appear at this anniversary of The Progressive Case,
which tested whether information about the design of nuclear weapons
could be published in the mass media. What strikes me the most
strongly about the case today is how much things have changed. The
problem today is not to get information about the bomb out, the problem
is to keep it in. And the press is essential to keep pressure on the
governments of the world to do a better job of keeping it in.
We have just leamed that Libya purchased a workable bomb
design from a nuclear smuggling network set up by Dr. A.Q. Khan, the
"father" of Pakistan's nuclear bomb. That design was given to Pakistan
in the early 1980s by China, which had already tested it. It is an
implosion device that uses highly-enriched uranium. Pakistan then
provided the design to middle-men, who were tasked with importing its
components. The design thus made its way into the nuclear black
market. The CIA has brought the design back to the United States in a
box. How many more people have it? We do not know. There were
also engineering drawings showing how to make it. Will it wind up on
the web, or perhaps in The Progressive magazine?
I would like to talk about Mr. Khan's smuggling network and what
it did.
First, the bomb design was not the important thing. The most
important thing Khan provided was the means to make nuclear
material—the fissile material that actually explodes in a bomb. This
consists of either plutonium or highly-enriched uranium. That is what is
hardest to make. Eighty to ninety percent of the effort in the Manhattan
Project was devoted to making this material.
Libya had a contract for about 10,000 centrifuges, which could
have produced at least ten bombs' worth of material per year. Iran was
outfitted with centrifuges in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Libya was
still getting things last fall. A.Q. Khan got millions in bribes, built big
houses, and traveled around the world for more than a decade. He had
been known since the 1970s as a nuclear thief and was indicted for it.
He nevertheless succeeded in supplying Iran and North Korea with what
they needed, and Libya was on its way to the same result. Last October,
our intelligence agents finally intercepted a shipment. A little bit later,
Libya agreed to give up all of its WMD programs, which meant that
23 Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; expert on international proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
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Libya would stop suffering from international sanctions and would not
have to worry about being invaded.
But where were our U.S. intelligence agents during the past
decade? Why did not we detect this smuggling network and stop it
before it succeeded? Stopping such networks is the first line of defense,
but it is not working. Networks need to be stopped before they succeed.
Why is the press not pointing out what amounts to an intemational
intelligence disaster?
Sadly enough, it is not an isolated failure. Our intelligence
agencies missed Iraq's nuclear program before the first Gulf War, when
they failed to detect the existence of giant devices for enriching uranium
called calutrons. They also missed Iraq's biological weapon program.
In addition, they missed Iraq's lack of WMD production before the
most recent war. And they missed India's nuclear test in 1998, and
could not find the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. We obviously need
more accountability from our intelligence agents. We spend thirty to
fifty billion dollars a year on them and we still don't have the answers
to the big questions. These are quite simple: How many nukes does
North Korea have? How much of a threat was Saddam Hussein? How
far is Iran from building a bomb?
We have an extensive system in the developed countries for
controlling the export of sensitive items like centrifuges for enriching
uranium. But this Pakistani network went around it like the German
army around the Maginot line. The good news is that the Libyans are
turning everybody in the network in, which includes at a minimum all
of Libya's suppliers. We now have a fair chance of rolling the network
up. And with Libya and Iraq gone as proliferation threats, we are down
to Iran and North Korea. There are only these two current cases left,
with perhaps Brazil lurking in the far background.
Iran is really the big question. If Iran goes nuclear, then the nonproliferation treaty and export controls and intemational diplomacy will
all have failed. The Middle East will have another nuclear power, and
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt will have to think about their own
nuclear plans. Iran also supports terrorism, and has done so for many
years.
Iran could take a number of different paths. It could follow the
Libyan model and get rid of its nuclear fuel cycle plants, centrifuges,
heavy water reactors, and associated equipment. It would be left with a
power reactor it really does not need, due to its large amount of oil and
natural gas. Or, it could follow the North Korea model and drop out of
the non-proliferation treaty and tell everyone to go to hell. This would
probably result in intemational sanctions that would be unpleasant and
perhaps even painful for Iran to endure. Or, it could follow the Iraqi
model of deception, which Iran seems to be using now. Iran could try
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to deceive international inspectors, engage in secret activities and play
for time. Or, finally, it could follow a new model and achieve a
"breakout" option while staying within the non-proliferation treaty.
This would entail making plutonium and highly-enriched uranium
legally under the treaty until reaching bomb capability, and then
dropping out of the treaty and using its nuclear advanees to quickly get
the bomb. It may be hard for us to distinguish which of these last two
options Iran is really following.
The nuclear weapon timeline for Iran is rather unclear. What we
do know is that Iran is much closer than Saddam was when we invaded
Iraq recently. And Iran is probably closer than Saddam was at the time
of the first Gulf War. Iran's long range missile program is important
too. The only purpose of a long-range missile is to carry a nuclear
warhead. The existence of such a program reveals one's intentions.
So, what is the world-wide threat today? Looking around the
world, we see the following:
Egypt, Syria, and Iran can all target Israel with chemical or highexplosive warheads on missiles. Certainly many hundreds of these
missiles and possibly as many as a thousand could be targeted on Israel.
Israel, in turn, can target all of these countries with the same, plus
nuclear warheads. These nuclear warheads number in the low hundreds
and are sufficient to destroy every target in the Middle East. India and
Pakistan can target each other with scores of nuclear warheads on both
missiles and aircraft. India's expanding nuclear capability will cover
China soon and may cover the entire world within the next decade
(India hopes to deploy submarines with nuclear missiles). Iran will
achieve nuclear weapon status in a few years unless someone
intervenes. Iran will also continue to develop its missile program.
North Korea may continue to produce nuclear weapon material and may
even begin to export it. Virtually all of these capabilities will have been
built with imports, and will continue to be developed with imports. So
export controls will be a great tool for slowing it down, and so will an
effective intelligence organization. We do not have the latter, and
without it, the former does not do us much good.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Anthony Lewis^^
I have listened with fascination to this discussion and earlier to the
discussion of The Progressive case, but I am not going to talk about
24 Former columnist for the New York Times and the author of three books.
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that. Instead, my subject is where we are today on the issues of national
security and the Constitution.
The first thing 1 have to say is that the issues are utterly different
from those in The Progressive case, or earlier in the Pentagon Papers
case.25 In 1971 in the Pentagon Papers, and in 1979 in The
Progressive, the government tried to prevent the press from publishing
material that officials asserted would threaten national security.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the government
has not directly engaged the press. It has not sought to enjoin a
newspaper or broadcast station from disclosing something. Rather, it
has invoked national security on the whole to deprive individuals of
fundamental rights. In the name of fighting terrorism it has abruptly
overridden guarantees in the Constitution and international law. Ideas
that we had regarded as alien to American beliefs—detention without
trial, denial of the right to counsel, years of interrogation in isolation—
are now American practices.
Let me remind you of one far-reaching claim of national security
authority by the Bush administration. It claims the power to designate
any American citizen as a supporter of terrorism, and then to hold that
citizen in detention indefinitely, in solitary confinement, without trial
and without the right to counsel. According to the administration's
legal argument, the imprisoned person is to have virtually no chance to
challenge his or her designation as a terrorist. Two American citizens
have been imprisoned in that way for more than twenty months now. I
shall briefly describe one.
Jose Padilla was bom in Brooklyn, became a gang member, served
several prison terms, and converted to Islam in prison. In May 2002, he
flew into O'Hare Airport in Chicago from abroad. Federal agents
arrested him as a material witness before a grand jury in New York
investigating the attack on the World Trade Center. He was taken to
New York and brought before a federal judge, who appointed a lawyer,
Donna Newman, to represent him. The hearing was set for June 11,
2002. But on June 10, Attomey General Ashcrofl announced that
Padilla would be held without trial as an enemy combatant. "We have
captured a known terrorist," Ashcroft said on television.^® "While in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, [he] trained with the enemy... In
apprehending [him]... we have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to
attack the United States by exploding a radioactive 'dirty bomb.'"^''
That sounded frightening, but there had not been, and still has not
been, any legal process to determine the tmth of Ashcroft's colorful
25 New York Times Co. v. Unites States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
26 CNN, Ashcroft statement on 'dirty bomb' suspect (Jtme 10, 2002), available at
http://www.cnn.eom/2002/US/06/10/ashcroft.announcement/.
27 Id.
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pronunciation of Padilla's guilt. At first, the Bush administration's
lawyers said that Padilla should have no right at all to challenge his
imprisonment in court. Then it said he could have a habeas corpus
proceeding, the traditional way to test the legality of imprisonment. But
the government argued that it had to show only some evidence to justify
its detention of Padilla—^that is, any evidence, and not beyond a
reasonable doubt as in a criminal case or by a preponderance of
evidence as in a civil case. Padilla's lawyer. Donna Newman, filed a
petition for habeas corpus. The evidence produced by the Bush
administration in response was a statement by a Pentagon official, not
subject to cross-examination and without any firsthand witnesses to
anything Padilla was said to have done. The judge found that that was
enough to justify Padilla's detention. But he did say that Donna
Newman should have a right to talk with Padilla, for the limited purpose
of getting from him any facts inconsistent with his designation as a
terrorist. The government lawyers reacted to that last very partial
decision in favor of Padilla with outrage, saying that any visit to Padilla
by a lawyer might damage his interrogation by destroying the necessary
"atmosphere of dependency and trust between the subject and
interrogator.That seemed to me to be a rather candid statement—
that the purpose of the interrogation was to overbear the detainee's will.
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, here in New York, held that President Bush had no such
authority to hold Padilla in detention. The vote was two to one, and
even the dissenter thought Padilla should have an unrestricted right to
counsel. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear that case, and it will be
argued in the Court on April 28.
A few weeks ago the Defense Department announced that Padilla
would be allowed to see his lawyers. It maintained its position that,
legally, he had no right to see a lawyer, but as a matter of grace it would
allow him to meet Donna Newman with appropriate security
restrictions. Ms. Newman sent copies of her briefs to the Navy brig
where Padilla is held in South Carolina, and the briefs were censored
before they were shown to Padilla.
Two hours after announcing that the lawyers would be permitted to
see Padilla under restrictive conditions, the govemment filed a brief in
the Supreme Court arguing that the issue of the right to counsel in the
case was now moot.
Tomorrow, Donna Newman and her co-counsel, Andrew Patel, are
going to visit Padilla at the Navy brig. They do not expect to learn a lot,
or even ask very much—because the Defense Department has ordered

28 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49 (2003) (quoting declaration of Admiral Jacoby
at 4-5).

1384

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:4

that a department official be present during the conversation, and that it
be videotaped. Under those circumstances counsel cannot have a
candid discussion of facts or strategy.^^
The theme of this conference has been national security and a free
press. You may be wondering what the free press has to do with the
Padilla case and other repressive actions taken by the Bush
administration since 9/11. My answer is that the press has little to do
with them. And more to the point, it has had little to say about them.
Coverage of the administration's record on civil liberties since 9/11 has,
in my judgment, been spotty at best.
1 first heard about the claim that the administration could
indefinitely detain American citizens by calling them enemy combatants
when it held the other of the two men who have been under detention,
Yaser Hamdi. 1 saw it in a story a few paragraphs long in the New York
Times. I was bewildered. I wondered why that claim was not important
news. The fate of Hamdi and Padilla has rarely made it to page one
since then, except when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Hamdi
case and the Padilla case, when it rightly was a page one story.
Over the more than two years since the Bush administration first
made its audacious claim of the right to detain people on its own
motion, it has had little prominence in the print, or especially in the
broadcast press. I doubt that one American in a thousand, and that is
generous, probably one American in a hundred thousand, or a million,
knows about the cases or knows that his government claims the right to
put him or her in detention forever on its own say-so.
The Bush administration is often accused of unilateralism in
foreign affairs; but the unilateralism is, to me, just as striking at home in
the enemy combatant cases. The administration asserts, on its own, a
legal right to detain citizens without trial. Then it claims the right to
define not only the law but the facts, because it allows the detained
person no effective opportunity to challenge his or her designation as a
terrorist.
Think about the enemy combatant cases in comparison with The
Progressive case. Which government action constitutes a worse threat
to the constitutional freedoms of Americans? It seems obvious, to me at
least, that our rights are far more menaced by the proposition that the
government can put any of us in prison without trial or access to
counsel.

29 The Supreme Court decided Rumsfeld v. Padilla, on June 28, 2004, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
It reversed the judgment, holding that Padilla's habeas action had been filed in the wrong court,
but in the companion case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), where there was no
procedural obstacle to habeas corpus, it held that a citizen thus detained must have a fair
opportunity to know and meet the allegations against him.
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In the Pentagon Papers case Justice Potter Stewart, in his separate
opinion, addressed the role of the press on issues related to the national
security. On those matters, he said, the usual legislative and judicial
checks on executive power scarcely operate. Congress and the Courts
tend to defer to the President. So, he wrote:
the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power . . . may
lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public
opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic
government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is
alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the
First Amendment. For without an informed and free press there
caimot be an enlightened people.^®

It is not only in the enemy combatant cases that the press seems to
me to have failed to perform the function described by Justice Stewart.
Another example is the sweep of aliens ordered by Attorney General
Ashcroft after 9/11. Thousands were arrested on suspicion of having
something to do with terrorism. They were held for weeks or months,
their names kept secret, their places of detention kept secret, then
mostly charged with such immigration violations as overstaying a visa,
and deported after secret deportation hearings. In prison, while they
were being detained for long periods without charge, they were
humiliated and assaulted. At the Metropolitan Detention Center in
Brooklyn, they were allowed one telephone call a week to try to find a
lawyer. Guards informed them of that by asking, "Are you okay?"
That was supposedly shorthand for "Do you want to call a lawyer?"
We found all of that out when the Justice Department's Inspector
General, Glenn A. Fine, investigated and filed a report. He told about
the abuse of the prisoners. He said they had been arrested more or less
at random, with no probable cause to think they had a connection with
terrorism. The whole process of arrests and confinement had relatively
little coverage in the press until the Inspector General's report. Then
there were serious stories. The New York Times"'?, legal writer, Adam
Liptak, wrote in an analytical piece that the treatment of the aliens
inverted the foundational principles of the American legal system.
The secrecy that pervaded the alien sweep—even wives were not
told where their missing husbands were—is the sort of thing that usually
arouses the press. But with some honorable exceptions, the detentions
were not treated as a major story. Again, I wonder why.
One reason for the relatively tepid response to the incursions on
civil liberties since 9/11 is that they have on the whole been directed at
either marginal figures or those with whom Americans on the whole do
not readily identify. There has not been a case, as there was during

30 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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World War I, when well-known figures such as Eugene Debs were
imprisoned by the Wilson administration. Editors are not going to see
Jose Padilla as a person with whom readers or viewers can readily
identify. But the principle the Bush administration seeks to establish in
his case—that a President can jail any American indefinitely without a
trial—is what matters.
Another reason may be that the interests of the press itself have not
been directly attacked. A case like the Pentagon Papers, in which the
press's freedom is at issue, always gets more attention from editors.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who was one of the press's great
friends, once chided the press for crying doom or fascism whenever it
lost even a minor case in the courts.
Finally the press, like politicians and the rest of us, were so
traumatized by 9/11 that we felt it right to unite behind the President.
That urge was so strong that we hardly reacted when Attorney General
Ashcroft told us that dissent and concern about civil liberties were
unpatriotic. It was not an offhand statement by Ashcroft. In his
prepared testimony for the Senate Judiciary Committee he said, "To
those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my
message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists—for they erode our
national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to
America's enemies."3i I know of no other Attorney General in my
lifetime who has expressed such contempt for First Amendment values.
The impulse to get on the national security team in the face of a
terrorist threat had a particularly egregious example about a month after
9/11, when five major television networks broadcast a taped message
from Osama Bin Laden. You may remember that President Bush's
national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, got top executives of the
television networks on a conference telephone call and urged them to
cut inflammatory language from any future Bin Laden tapes. She also
warned that his talks might include coded instructions to terrorists, a
singularly unpersuasive notion since the original tapes had already been
broadcast in Arabic by A1 Jazeera. The network executives agreed
among themselves to broadcast only short segments of future tapes.
Walter Isaacson of CNN said, "We're not going to step on the
landmines [Doctor Rice] was talking about."32 A more candid
explanation would have been, "We don't want to look unpatriotic."
There was a similar press tendency to take its lead from the White
House in the run-up to the Iraq War. Diligent digging would have
31 Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 6,
2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycom
mittee.htm.
32 Bill Carter & Felicity Barringer, Networks Agree to U.S. Request to Edit Future bin Laden
Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at B2.
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found some of the doubts that we now know existed in the intelligence
business about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. If
the press had been more critical, more independent, the public would
not have been led so easily from Al-Qaeda to Iraq as the enemy. Led so
easily that forty-four percent of respondents in a poll thought there were
Iraqis among the terrorists that hit the World Trade Center on
September 11.
One of the earlier speakers said we are becoming more skeptical as
time passes, and I hope that is true. I hope we are less willing to just
unite behind the government and take for granted everything the
government says is right. I hope that is true, but I am not yet convinced.
I earlier quoted Justice Stewart on how we need an informed and
free press to check the great power of the President when he invokes
national security. To those two adjectives, I think we have to add a
third: a courageous press. When we look back at the Pentagon Papers
episode, it is the courage of The New York Times, and then other
newspapers, that stands out. I have been critical of the profession I
love, so it is only right that I now quote a ringing statement in praise of
that profession and its courage. It is from the concurring opinion of
Justice Hugo L. Black in the Pentagon Papers case. "Paramount among
the responsibilities of a free press," Justice Black wrote, "is the duty to
prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and
sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign
shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their
courageous reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and
other newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose that the
Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of
government that led to the Vietnam War, the newspapers nobly did
precisely that which the Foimders hoped and trusted they would do."^^
The duty is not only to report with courage what underlies government
decisions to send Americans off to die of foreign shot and shell, but to
report govemment actions menacing the Constitutional protections that
have kept us free.
DEAN RUDENSTESfE; I want to thank Tony very much for that.
If Tony felt chilled as he followed our last speaker, he might have left
us in the deep freeze.
It seems as though there are two attacks
underway. One is from without and one is from within. Before we go
to lunch, I thought I might read the last paragraph of Tony Lewis's last
column that he published in the New York Times on December 15, 2001.
If for no other reason, it is a concept or an idea that seeks to insure all of
us that there is a remedy and it lies within ourselves. Tony wrote, "In

33 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
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the end 1 believe that faith in reason will prevail. But it will not happen
automatically. Freedom under law is hard work. If rulers cannot be
trusted with arbitrary power, it is up to citizens to raise their voices at
injustice."^'' And then he wrote this as his last line, "The most
important office in a democracy," Justice Louis Brandeis said, "is the
office of citizen."
Thank you very much to all of you and all the guests today.

34 Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Hail and Farewell, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2001, at A31.

